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The Trouble with Taxes:
Fairness, Tax Policy, and the Constitution
by LEO P. MARTINEZ*
"It's not fair."
A child's common plaint
Introduction
The word "fairness" has a simple ring to it. Despite this
simplicity, fairness stands for a complicated set of moral and practical
instructions inculcated in us since childhood. Consequently, fairness
presents knotty problems of application for legal and policy analysts
in the formulation of tax policy.
Dr. Stephen Wolfram, the author of A NEW KIND OF SCIENCE,
has posited that the complexity of the universe is generated by a
relatively simple set of rules.1 Indeed, it is an article of faith among
scientists that the simplest, most elegant theory of any phenomenon
generally proves to be the most accurate and enduring. Can the same
be said of a system of taxation? This may well be a fruitless inquiry.
As one scholar has remarked, "[i]t is sometimes said that it is utopian
to look for a simple tax law.",2 This is in part because our tax system
uses a set of complex rules to reach a balance between two relatively
straightforward goals - revenue generation and fairness.'
* Professor of Law and Academic Dean, University of California, Hastings College
of the Law. Special thanks to Professor Nancy Staudt of the Washington University
School of Law, Professor Marjorie Kornhauser of the Tulane University School of Law
and to my colleagues Vic Amar, David Faigman, Evan Lee and Calvin Massey for their
insights into and inspiration for the creation of this article. The author gratefully
acknowledges the diligent and able research assistance of Paul Stinson, Michelle Altick,
Catherine Paskoff Chang and Simone Katz.
1. STEPHEN WOLFRAM, A NEW KIND OF SCIENCE 2-3 (2002).
2. DAVID F. BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAX 266 (Harvard Univ.
Press 1986).
3. For an argument that details this tradeoff of simplicity for equity, see Samuel A.
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A tax system, unlike a theory of the universe, must not only be
simple it must also be "fair." At a minimum, it must be perceived as
fair by the taxpaying public in order to withstand the public's scrutiny.
The fairness of taxation and the meaning of tax fairness have, not
surprisingly, spawned wide-ranging debate. More than a few
distinguished theorists have posited that the notion of fairness (or, in
some instances, "equality") has neither meaning nor place in legal
analysis.4
Our aversion to unfairness is innate. Anyone with some
knowledge of children recognizes that a child's sensitivity to
unfairness is already well developed even at an early age. Thus, for
example, when a sibling intrudes in a child's space in the back seat of
an automobile, the request for redress of the attendant intrusion and
unfair allocation of space is swift and pointed. So, too, is the response
of an adult who perceives a misallocation of tax burdens. To
underscore the case, where there is a perceived inconsistency or
unfairness in the tax system, the public's reaction is strongly negative.'
At the same time, perceptions of fairness in taxation appear to bear
no more than that of a child's sophistication in terms of policy or
analysis. As Professor John A. Miller has explained, "[a] few years
ago the smartest person in the world was asked what she thought of
our tax system. This person, Marilyn vos Savant, replied that it was
'clearly unfair' to require some persons to pay more taxes than others
.... In her view, one's payment of taxes is analogous to the purchase
of a hamburger. Why, she asked, should one person pay more than
another person for a hamburger?"7
This article probes the contours of the concept of fairness in
taxation. I begin and end with the observation that fairness or the
Donaldson, The Easy Case Against Tax Simplification, 22 VA. TAX REV. 645, 681-91
(2003).
4. See, e.g., Louis KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE(Harvard Univ. Press 2002); Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L REV.537 (1982); Christopher J. Peters, Equality Revisited, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1210 (1997).
5. See, e.g., Robert J. Leonard, A Pragmatic View of Corporate Integration, 35 TaxNotes 889, 896 (1987) (explaining a strong negative reaction to an informal suggestion of
President Reagan that the corporate income tax be repealed - a suggestion that was
quickly retracted after fierce public criticism).
6. JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO
THE GREAT DEBATE OVER TAX REFORM 61-62 (2d ed. 2000).
7. John A. Miller, Equal Taxation. A Commentary, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 529, 529(2000) (citing Marilyn vos Savant, Ask Marilyn, PARADE MAGAZINE, Apr. 10, 1994, at 12.
Ms. vos Savant, whatever her I.Q., is apparently not familiar with the nuances of
progressive taxation.)
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perception of fairness in taxation is a deceptively unsophisticated
proposition. Part I includes a brief description of the public
perception of fairness in the context of taxation. Part II follows with
an exploration of the concept of fairness as a fundamental tenet of tax
policy with particular scrutiny of the principle that equals should be
taxed equally. In Part III, I deal with fairness as a constitutional
norm and I argue that, while fairness in taxation has solid policy
underpinnings, fairness (at least as a substantive proposition) is not a
matter of constitutional dimension. I conclude in Part IV that
fairness is, with some minor qualifications, not a matter of deep
constitutional lore or economic arcana, but rather an instinctual
matter more analogous to a child's perception of fairness than to that
of a modern day economist's.
I. Public Perception of Taxes
Every ,overnment needs its citizens' financial support - whether
voluntarily or involuntarily obtained - not only to function efficiently
but also to function at all. This idea is so basic to government that it
has been observed that a penniless state cannot protect adequately
the rights of its citizens.8 Justices Holmes and Brandeis famously
captured the essence of this fiscal reality when they said: "Taxes are
what we pay for civilized society.... " 9
It follows that the power to tax is among the most fundamental
and wide-reaching powers of government. The Supreme Court has
stated "[t]hat the taxing power is of vital importance; that it is
essential to the existence of government; are truths which it cannot be
necessary to reaffirm."'
The tax system in the United States exists to raise revenue and to
ensure stable economic growth." A less recognized, though still
crucial, role of the domestic tax system is to function as a vehicle of
8. STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS: WHY LIBERTY
DEPENDS ON TAXES 35-48 (1999).
9. Compafiia de Tabacos v. Collector, 275 U.S. 87, 100 (1927) (Holmes, J. &
Brandeis, J., dissenting). The United States Supreme Court in 1935 also declared that
"taxes are the lifeblood of government .... Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 259
(1935). Cicero expressed a similar thought: "[t]axes are the sinews of the state." Marcus
Tullius Cicero, quoted in BERNARD WOLFMAN & JAMES P. HOLDEN, ETHICAL
PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE, at xviii (1981).
10. Providence Bank v. Billings, 29 U.S. 514,561 (1830).
11. JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 2 (5th ed. 1987); JOHN F. WITrE,
THE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 67 (1985).
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social and economic policy. 2 The significance of the tax system both
to the nation's fiscal health and its social well being argues for a
system of taxation that is fair, if for no other reason than to facilitate
the collection of revenue. Fairness is indispensable to enacting tax
legislation because it increases taxpayer morale and enhances
voluntary compliance." Perceptions of fairness facilitate tax
collection and they explain why fair distribution of the tax burden is a
central concern in the enactment of tax legislation. 4
Chief Justice Marshall opined that the power to tax requires
popular confidence that such power will not be abused." Similarly,
Adam Smith, in The Wealth of Nations, asserted that "[aill nations
have endeavored ... to render their taxes as equal as they could
contrive; as certain, as convenient to the contributor, both in the time
and in the mode of payment, and in proportion to the revenue which
they brought to the prince, as little burdensome to the people.' 6 It
12. PECHMAN, supra note 11, at 2; see Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device
for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Expenditures, 83 HARV.
L. REV. 705 (1970).
13. See Jonathan Skinner & Joel Slemrod, An Economic Perspective on Tax Evasion,
38 NAT'L. TAX J. 345, 348-349 (1985); EXECUTIVE TASK FORCE, COMMISSIONER'S
PENALTY STUDY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, REPORT ON CIVIL TAX PENALTIES ch.
II 2-3 (1989).
14. See, e.g., JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION
OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986 7 (1986) (noting that the primary objective of the
reform is to ensure that individuals with similar income pay similar amounts of tax);
SENATE FINANCE COMM., 97TH CONG., REPORT ON THE TAX EQUITY AND FISCAL
RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF 1982 97 (1982) (explaining that the act is designed to improve
tax equity); PECHMAN, supra note 11, at 5 ("A distinct policy objective of the federal
taxation schemes is the distribution function .. "); RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY
B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 5 (1973) ("Social values
may require adjustments in the distribution of income and wealth .... "); SLEMROD &
BAKIJA, supra note 6, at 51 ("Fairness... deserves close scrutiny because much of the
bewildering complexity of the tax law is justified in its name.");
Even the Executive takes pains to cite fairness as a centerpiece of tax initiatives. John M.
Broder, With the Federal Deficit Falling, The President Weighs a Tax Cut, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 5, 1997, at Al (noting that President Clinton would consider tax reduction if it was
"fair").
The need for equity in the system of taxation is also shown in the scheme of criminal and
civil penalties - the primary method of enforcement of the tax laws. Tax penalties are
said to establish the fairness of the tax system by giving the noncompliant taxpayer what
she deserves. EXECUTIVE TASK FORCE, supra note 13, at ch. III 2; see also MICHAEL I.
SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 12.01 (2d ed. 1991). To the extent that
this retributive component of punishment is fair, the tax laws are fair.
15. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,431 (1819).
16. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 779 (Edwin Cannan ed., Random
House 1937) (1776).
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goes without saying that balancing the government's need for revenue
with a fair revenue-generating mechanism is a delicate task.
This requirement of fairness (or at least the perception of
fairness) has long been a veritable constant17, and it is rare that
discourse on taxation does not emphasize fairness as a fundamental
and desirable attribute of any tax system. The eighteenth-century
commentator William Blackstone reasoned that public perception of
the government's power to tax is a crucial element of tax
enforcement . He illustrated his point by highlighting the popular
preference for one tax over another.
In England, in his day, a retail or consumption tax, called an
excise duty, represented an economical method of taxation that
resulted in lower prices than customs taxes. However, as Blackstone
explained, the "rigor and arbitrary proceedings" of tax law violations
caused the tax to be so unpopular that mere rumor of such a tax was
dismissed by pundits as an outrageous sham."
In contrast, the public embraced a post office tax with
"cheerfulness, as, instead of being a burden, it [was] a manifest
advantage to the public."2°  Taking a demonstrably utilitarian or
consent theory approach to taxation, Blackstone said, "[t]here cannot
be devised a more eligible method than this of raising money upon
the subject: for therein both the government and the people find a
mutual benefit. The government acquires a large revenue; and the
people do their business with greater ease, expedition, and cheapness,
than they would be able to do if no such tax (and of course no such
office) existed., 21 Though the post office tax might not have been as
economically efficient as the consumption tax, the public's willingness
to pay the former made it the better option because of the perceived
17. See Tappan v. Merch. Nat'l Bank, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 490, 504 (1873); Dane v.
Jackson, 256 U.S. 589, 598-99 (1921); Morton Salt Co. v. City of South Hutchinson, 159
F.2d 897, 901 (10th Cir. 1947); HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 86th CONG.,
GUIDELINES OF INCOME TAX REFORM'FOR THE 1960's 157, 158-60 (Comm. Print 1959)
(authored by Neil H. Jacoby); Joseph T. Sneed, The Criteria of Federal Income Tax Policy,
17 STAN. L. REv. 567, 567-69 (1965).
18. According to Blackstone, municipal law is the "rule of civil conduct prescribed by
the supreme power in a state... commanding what is right, and prohibiting what is
wrong," and one of its purposes is to define and lay down these rights and wrongs of
society. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES **53-55 (italics omitted). Thus, "in
things naturally indifferent, the very essence of right and wrong depends upon the
direction of the laws to do or to omit them." Id at *55.
19. Id. at **318-19 (citing Com. Jour. Oct. 8. 1642) (emphasis added).
20. Id. at *321.
21. Id. at **321-23.
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fairness of the post office tax and its benefit to the public at large.
Empirical studies reveal that the modern populace's perception
of tax fairness continues to diverge significantly from reality. In one
prominent study, Michael Roberts and Peggy Hite discovered that,
though the public may believe current taxation is unfair, when asked
to specify what rate structure would be fair (based on income)
respondents tended to choose rates remarkably similar to those
actually in place.:2 Specifically, when asked an open-ended question
regarding the level of taxation that would be "fair" for nine income
levels, ranging from $5,000 to $100,000, respondents, on average,
chose rates that were the same or higher than those currently
imposed (as of the year of the study). 23 As the authors noted, this
conclusion was striking, given the widely held view that tax burdens
are too high.
A majority of respondents in the Roberts and Hite study also
preferred a graduated to a flat tax rate, 24 although respondents could
generally be broken down into three relatively equal groups-steep
progressives, mild progressives and flat raters-regarding their tax
allocation preferences.2' The latter observation perhaps explains a
great deal about why fairness is such a tough nut to crack when it
comes to determining an equitable allocation of tax burdens. With
the nation split fairly evenly into thirds among those favoring various
rate structures, cries of unfairness will arise no matter what rate
structure is imposed.
What does this mean for those seeking to create a fair tax
system? Roberts and Hite simply conclude that "the general public is
not knowledgeable about effective tax rates," and that perceptions of
the inherent unfairness of the tax system may have more to do with
the hyping in the media and amongst politicians of marginal rates,
rather than the rate structure itself.26
22. Michael L. Roberts & Peggy A. Hite, Progressive Taxation, Fairness, and
Compliance, 16 LAW & POL'Y 27,32 (1994).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 35. Sixty percent agreed that graduated tax rates are fairer, while 33%
preferred a flat rate, and 7% were indifferent between the two.
25. Id. at 36. Thirty-four percent preferred a flat 20% tax rate as the fairest, 28%
chose the mildly progressive 1987-1991 rate schedule, and 33% preferred the more steeply
progressive 1981-1986 rate schedule as the fairest.
26. Id. at 40. For an assessment of the interplay among public perception, the media,
and taxpayer compliance, see Leandra Lederman, Tax Compliance and the Reformed IRS,
51 U. KAN. L. REV. 971, 1010 (2003). Professor Lederman warns that:
[u]nfortunately, the media focus on horror stories and the need to "reform" the IRS
may suggest to taxpayers that IRS personnel have found that they need to "abuse"
[Vol. 31:4
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That is, it would seem that tax fairness (or unfairness) is not a
lofty concept for most Americans. Absent the persistent frothing
over "government sponsored theft" and the pillaging of the American
public by an out-of-control government, most taxpayers probably
would be hard-pressed to squawk about or even to identify a tax
injustice. To be sure, rate hikes, like trips to the dentist, are never
popular. But, at bottom, while the average taxpayer may find herself
feeling queasy around April 15, most people simply do not have the
time or the inclination to take to the streets over unfairness unless
some major push-button issues are involved.27
II. Fair is Fair, or is it?
John Stuart Mill's exposition of the relationship between justice
and utility used taxation as an example for demonstrating how one's
method of justice can vary widely from another's. He observed that
while one could argue that everybody should be taxed the same
amount, "as the subscribers to a mess, or to a club," another could
assert that justice required "graduated taxation." 28 Mill concluded
that utilitarianism should drive tax policy because the many notions
of justice only add confusion.29
Despite Mill's caution, we continue to try to incorporate the
concept of fairness (or justice) into our political discourse. As a
matter of sound policy and as a matter of pure intuition, the apparent
simplicity of fairness is captivating. What is fair, or how to achieve
fairness, however, remains elusive.
Attempts to grapple with fairness in the context of taxation have
been undertaken by law and economics theorists such as Professors
Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell. 30 Kaplow and Shavell's general
taxpayers in order to collect from them. This may tend to suggest that
noncompliance is rampant, which, in turn, may tend to undermine normative
commitments to compliance.
lt
27. David Bradford states:
Even though polls may register declining confidence in the income tax, what
many people mean by reform is lower taxes, and few are prepared to give up their
own tax preferences in the interest of a simple, low-rate system. Politicians
typically report little serious constituent pressure for simplification or
rationalization of the law.
BRADFORD, supra note 3, at 289 (citation omitted).
28. J.S. ILL, UTILITARIANISM 102 (Roger Crisp ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1998)
(1863).
29. Id.
30. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L.
Summer 20041
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theme is that notions of fairness, which may include ideas regarding
justice, rights, and related concepts, will in some instances result in
outcomes which do not advance individuals' well-being.3a This may
seem facially true: if fairness forces me to split my lime popsicle with
my brother, even though he hates lime popsicles, and I will be made
miserable by the split, what exactly has been gained? Kaplow and
Shavell would prefer that all choices be made in accordance with
welfarist principles, which would always select the outcome that
results in the greater increase in individuals' well-being. 3
Yet, Kaplow and Shavell recognize that their pure principle of
fairness, in which legal rules are evaluated without regard for
individuals' well-being, is not typical, and that most legal analysts will
hold views of fairness that consider individuals' well-being. 3  They
further recognize, and even endorse, the use of notions of fairness as
standards for everyday decision-making, as guides to common
morality, and as "tastes" which may be included in a welfarist
analysis.34 Hence, one is left with the distinct impression that it is not
fairness which Kaplow and Shavell reject, but some stripped-down
version of distributive justice that requires normatively justifiable
outcomes without regard for human consequences."
Another academic who has probed the idea of fairness in
taxation, Professor Marjorie Kornhauser, has emphasized the
conceptual difficulty of defining fairness. She advances the thesis that
the multi-faceted components of fairness, including economic,
philosophical, political, and practical elements, make fairness too
complex to determine. 36
REv. 961 (2001).
31. Id at 999-1000.
32. Id. at 1009. See also Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Notions of Fairness Versus
the Pareto Principle: On the Role of Logical Consistency, 110 YALE L. J. 237 (2000). In the
latter piece the authors also present a summary of their claim that consistent adherence to
notions of fairness may result in choices which violate Pareto optimality. This conclusion
has been disputed, however. See Howard F. Chang, A Liberal Theory of Social Welfare:
Fairness, Utility, and the Pareto Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 173 (2000).
33. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 30, at 1002-03.
34. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 32, at 249.
35. For an excellent critique of Kaplow and Shavell's theories, see Ward Farnsworth,
The Taste for Fairness, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 1992 (2002) (arguing that "notions of fairness
have a legitimate place in legal policymaking even if the aim of the enterprise is to
improve welfare").
36. Marjorie Kornhauser, What Do Women Want: Feminism and the Progressive
Income Tax, 47 AM. U.L. REv. 151,158 (1997). Distributive justice might be added to this
mix. LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND
JUSTICE 38-39 (2002).
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In the legislative arena, the concepts of fairness and utility
remain fundamental to the formulation and administration of federal
tax policy.37 Evidence of this ongoing pursuit of fairness can be found
in the "bewildering complexity" of the Internal Revenue Code
("I.R.C."). 38  Congress' desire to account for various personal
circumstances drives Capitol Hill to create complicated, multi-faceted
tax laws.39 Professor Donaldson argues that the fact that "Congress
has often sacrificed simplicity for the cause of equity... [is] an
implicit recognition that fair laws are more desirable than easy
laws." 4 Professor Musgrave, instead, would suggest that a good tax
structure is one that is simple and facilitates an equitable distribution
of the tax burden. The difficulty with this recommendation, however,
is that while "[e]veryone agrees that the tax system should be




there is far less agreement on what each person's fair share is.
37. Sneed, supra note 17, at 601 (theorizing that the two dominant criteria of federal
tax policy are equity and practicality). The primacy of these two considerations is
underscored by the I.R.S.'s study of reform of the penalty system. EXECUTIVE TASK
FORCE, supra note 13, at ch. III 3-4. The I.R.S. labels the two components fairness and
effectiveness, but the thrust of the study is essentially similar.
38. SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 6, at 51.
39. Ironically, as David F. Bradford has pointed out, the complexity and attendant
confusion involved in designing and administering a "fair" system can themselves prompt
perceptions of unfairness. "A law that can be understood (if at all) by only a tiny
priesthood of lawyers and accountants is naturally subject to popular suspicion."
BRADFORD, supra note 3, at 266.
40. Donaldson, supra note 4, at 681.
41. MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 14, at 193. Other theorists assert that
equity is one of the "fundamental means of achieving the main goals of taxation."
GEORGE F. BREAK & JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX REFORM: THE IMPOSSIBLE
DREAM? 4 (1975).
"[I]t is generally agreed that taxes should bear similarly upon all people in similar
circumstances." HENRY SIMONS, FEDERAL TAX REFORM 8 (Univ. of Chicago Press
1950). "[T]he subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support of the
government, as nearly as possible, in proportion to their respective abilities ...." SMITH,
supra note 16, at 777. For a concise and informative overview of these various historical
approaches to tax equity, see Richard A. Musgrave, Horizontal Equity, Once More, 43
NAT'L TAX J. 113 (1990).
Fair distribution of the tax burden also is an oft-cited concern in enacting tax legislation.
See, e.g., SENATE FINANCE COMM., supra note 14, at 97 (commenting that the Tax Equity
and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 was designed to improve tax equity); JOINT
COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, supra note 14, at 7 (stating that the primary objective is to
ensure that individuals with similar income pay similar amounts of tax); HOUSE COMM.
ON WAYS AND MEANS, 101ST CONG., REVENUE RECONCILIATION ACr OF 1990 2
(Comm. Print 101-37 1990) (detailing the attempt to distribute the tax burden "among all
taxpayers in a fair and equitable manner").
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Modern tax policy relies on two crude tools to strive towards a
definition of fairness: horizontal equity and vertical equity." Tax
theorists use these principles "as the standards for measuring the
fairness of the tax laws."43 Horizontal equity reflects the notion that
similarly situated taxpayers should carry the same burden." Vertical
equity, on the other hand, acknowledges that people with more
wealth should carry a larger burden.45 As will be shown, the tools we
have to assist in achieving fairness are, at best, imprecise.
Vertical equity finds its foothold in the idea that higher income
taxpayers who have a greater ability to pay taxes should contribute
relatively more tax dollars to the fisc than lower income taxpayers to
whom every dollar is dear.46 Thus, vertical equity concerns itself with
"the proper pattern of unequal taxes among people with unequal
incomes."47 The principle of vertical equity has not been recognized
as either constitutionally required or forbidden.4 Indeed, discussions
of vertical equity in general, under the guise of support or criticism of
progressive taxation abound, and I have saved my own musings as to
the constitutionality of progressive taxation for another work.49 For
the purposes of this article, it suffices to note, as more than one
commentator has, that any system of progressive taxation is subject to
criticism as unfair if the poor are disproportionately taxed and to
criticism as class warfare ("soaking the rich") if the wealthy are
42. Musgrave, supra note 41, (discussing the problem with horizontal equity and
vertical equity in a sophisticated but concise manner, with definitions). See Marjorie E.
Kornhauser, Equality, Liberty, and a Fair Income Tax, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607, 618-19
(1996); SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 6, at 51. But see Louis Kaplow, A Note on
Horizontal Equity, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 191, 191-96 (1992) (criticizing the Musgrave analysis
of horizontal equity).
43. Nancy C. Staudt, The Hidden Costs of the Progressivity Debate, 50 VAND. L. REV.
919,957 (1997).
44. SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 6, at 51.
45. MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 14, at 194.
46. See BREAK & PECHMAN, supra note 41, at 5 (noting that vertical equity is "the
distribution of tax burdens among people with different amounts of income and wealth");
David M. Hudson, Tax Policy and the Federal Taxation of the Transfer of Wealth, 19
WILLAMETrE L. REV. 1, 4 (1983); Staudt, supra note 43, at 940 (observing that
"utilitarianism imposes a moral obligation upon citizens to pay taxes pursuant to a tax
structure that minimizes overall costs - or maximizes aggregate utility").
47. MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 14,199 (emphasis added).
48. See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 (1992) (upholding a tax which treated pre-1975
through 1976 property owners more generously than purchasers of property after 1976).
49. See generally Leo P. Martinez, "To Lay and Collect Taxes": The Constitutional




If attempts to adhere to a principle of vertical equity present the
problem of establishing fairness in the tax rates between groups of
taxpayers, horizontal equity illustrates the difficulty of establishing
what those groups are. The principle of horizontal equity provides
that similarly situated taxpayers should be similarly taxed.
51
Horizontal equity is an intuitive concept that enjoys popular
acceptance.52  Yet, at the same time, horizontal equity is a core
problem in examining the notion of fairness.53
In the context of income taxation, the Haig-Simons approach
identifies income as the sum of an individual's consumption plus her
change in wealth over a relevant time period.-" Professor Eric Zolt
explains that "uniform treatment rests on the general acceptance of
the Haig-Simons definition of income and the desirability of global
taxation."55 He continues by observing that "[this] approach rests on
fairness grounds-individuals with equal income are taxed equally,
without regard to the source or the use of the income-and on
efficiency grounds-individuals face the same tax rate for different
investments." 56 Such a proposition hardly seems controversial, yet
attempts to include this intuitively appealing notion in viable
normative models of taxation have resulted in heated debate.5
7 For
example, Professor Richard Musgrave noted in 1976, that "[i]n the
absence of vertical equity norms, the case for horizontal equity is
50. SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 6, at 5-6 (noting that some critics see increasing
the tax burden on those with high incomes as "soaking the rich" or "class warfare"); see
also Maureen B. Cavanaugh, Democracy, Equality, and Taxes, 54 ALA. L. REV. 415, 456
(2003) ("soaking the rich" in the Athenian tax system).
51. MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 14. See also BREAK & PECHMAN, supra
note 41, at 5 (stating that a system which treats equally all those who are in economically
similar positions is known as horizontal equity); Kornhauser, supra note 42, at 619
("[H]orizontal equity says that those with equal amounts of income should pay equal
amounts of tax."); Hudson, supra note 46, at 3 (arguing that similarly situated persons
should be taxed in a similar manner).
52. "[M]ost people subscribe to at least the general principle of horizontal
equity...." BREAK & PECHMAN, supra note 41, at 6.
53. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Horizontal Equity: Measures in Search of a Principle, 42
NAT'L TAX J. 139 (1989); Musgrave, supra note 41.
54. Eric M. Zolt, The Uneasy Case for Uniform Taxation, 16 VA. TAX REV. 39, 46
(1996).
55. Id at 41.
56. Id at 46..
57. See Paul R. McDaniel & James R. Repetti, Horizontal and Vertical Equity: The
Musgrave/Kaplow Exchange, 1 FLA. TAX. REV. 607 (1993) (capturing the terms of the
debate succinctly).
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reduced to providing protection against malicious discrimination, an
objective which might be met more simply by a tax lottery. ' 'ss His
point was that horizontal equity meant little. Or, as Professor Zolt
has succinctly stated:
Perhaps the most powerful challenge to horizontal equity is
that it is, by itself, a meaningless concept. Simply saying
that we should accord equal treatment to equals adds little
or nothing. We need to choose an ethical framework
before making any comparisons, whether by comparing
equals or making "appropriate" comparisons among
unequals5 9
In other words, however intuitive the concept of horizontal
equity might be, the practical application of this principle, like that of
vertical equity, requires repetition of the observation that fairness is
elusive.60 A few examples illustrate the problem.
First, there is no normative or intrinsically fair level of taxation.
For example, it is not unfair to tax all taxpayers at the 10% rate
without deductions and it is not unfair to tax all taxpayers at the 35%
rate with some deductions. Indeed, during and after World War II,
58. Richard A. Musgrave, ET, OTand SBT, 6 J. PuB. ECON. 4 (1976), cited in Harvey E.
Brazer, Income Tax Treatment of the Family, in THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 225 (Henry
J. Aaron & Michael J. Boskin eds., The Brookings Institution 1980). This comment was a
reiteration of one made much earlier in RiCHARD A. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC
FINANCE (1959). "Without a scheme of vertical equity, the requirement of horizontal equity
at best becomes a safeguard against capricious discrimination - a safeguard which might be
provided equally well by a requirement that taxes be distributed at random." Id at 160. As
noted, however, Professor Musgrave has since reconsidered this position. See, e.g., Richard A.
Musgrave, Horizontal Equity, Once More, 43 NAT'L TAX J. 113 (1990); Richard A. Musgrave,
Horizontal Equity: A Further Note, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 354 (1993). I applaud Professor
Musgrave's original insight. I may not agree, however, with his subsequent abandonment
of this position, the essence of which has essentially become the constitutional norm for
deciding tax cases.
59. Zolt, supra note 54, at 96-97.
60. While Professor Marjorie Kornhauser has observed that "[t]heory and empiricism
are not opposites, but rather are engaged in a joint enterprise," theory and empiricism
nonetheless are uncomfortably juxtaposed. Komhauser, supra note 36, at 161. See also
Nancy C. Staudt's thoughts on the subject:
This narrow version of horizontal equity, which calls for Congress to impose
equal tax burdens on equally situated individuals, therefore raises a number of
barriers for policymakers .... (I]t is next to impossible to identify similarly
situated individuals and any attempt to do so will most likely produce the very
same inequities that theorists and legislatures seek to remedy.
Staudt, supra note 43, at 931.
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the highest marginal rate in the U.S. rose-astonishingly-above the
90% mark, and essentially remained there until 1964.61 Yet, there was
no armed uprising or storming of the White House by angry
taxpayers crying oppression or unfairness. Apparently, it is not
simply marginal rates that determine fairness.
Second, the existence of a set of deductions, credits or kinds of
income may act to define a class of "similarly situated" taxpayers.
Thus, taxpayers who make charitable deductions can fairly be treated
differently from other taxpayers who are more parsimonious. While
the system of charitable deductions is just one example, the different
classifications of income, the exclusion of income, and the system of
tax credits all contribute to a finer parsing of what constitutes
"similarly situated." There is no predetermined natural classification
system to which the tax system must correspond in order to be "fair."
That is, the tax code itself determines who is similarly situated, and
not the other way around. In the process, the tax code itself also
defines what is fair through its modes of classification. Therefore, it is
not surprising that a notion of fairness in taxation ex ante taxation is
hard to define, for no such notion exists-although our notions of
fairness and equality in other contexts are likely to intrude.
Third, the system of deductions, credits and kinds of income is a
dynamic one. That is, the elimination of tax deductions or credits, or
any tinkering with the Internal Revenue Code, necessarily affects
those who can be described as "similarly situated." For example,
those who own personal residences are not similarly situated those
who rent. Consequently, the existence of the home mortgage
deduction favors homeowners over renters. 62 Different treatment of
homeowners and renters can be justified on the basis that they are not
similarly situated. 63 It is not unfair to do so. If the home mortgage
deduction was eliminated, and all characteristics between renters and
homeowners were equal, the two groups would be similarly situated
within the tax code. Treating the two groups in the same way would
not be viewed as unfair. It follows that the very act of changing the
system of deductions, credits and kinds of income, does not result in
61. PECHMAN, supra note 11, at 301,313-14.
62. I.R.C. § 163(h)(2)(D) (2004) (allowing a deduction for qualified residence
interest).
63. "Although the tax law provides benefits for home ownership, no horizontal
inequity exists if everyone has the choice between owning and renting." Zolt, supra note
54, at 91.
O LEW1THTAXESqHmm r ")0( 1
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
inherent unfairness.'
With the myriad number of deductions, credits and exclusions
available in the I.R.C., the categories of "similarly situated"
taxpayers, controlling for income, might very, well number in the
thousands.6' Professor Zolt has observed that a result of thiscomplexity is that "uniform taxation" is assumed to offer:
[the] advantage of taxing all income in the same manner,
regardless of the source. We are told this is both fair and
efficient. It is fair because the tax system treats taxpayers
with similar amounts of income in a similar manner, even if
their income has been derived from different sources. It is
efficient because the tax system treats income from all sources
equally, thus minimizing the distortionary effect of taxes on
resource allocation.66
As Professor Zolt's summary of the uniform taxation pitch indicates,
the problem of classifying which taxpayers are "similarly situated" is a
function of how narrowly defined the term "similarly situated" is as it
pertains to horizontal equity.67 At the limit, the notion of "similarly
situated" is such that no taxpayer is similarly situated with another
and the principle of horizontal equity becomes nothing more than a
cruel joke.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, I do not challenge that the role of
fairness in taxation is essential. I agree with historian Robert Hughes'
observation that equality is the mother of harmony.6 The challenge
in making fairness a key part of a tax system and putting the principle
into practice is the difficulty of determining what is fair.69  The
64. A better way to phrase this is that certain forms of discrimination are easilyjustified. MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 36, at 162-166.
65. This is probably a very conservative estimate. I leave this exercise in forensic
probability to my more numbers-oriented colleagues.
66. Zolt, supra note 54, at 42.
67. JOSEPH J. MINAREK, MAKING TAX CHOICES 22 (John L. Palmer et al. eds., 1985)(describing the range of circumstances as enormous).
68. ROBERT HUGHES, BARCELONA 279 (Vintage Books 1993); see Kenneth W.
Simons, The Logic of Egalitarian Norms, 80 BOSTON U. L. REV. 693, 770 (2002)(recognizing that equality is both a weak principle and a potent one).
69. "What is fair or equitable is not susceptible to simple formulations or shortphrases, such as equal treatment of equals or appropriate differences of unequals." Zolt,
supra note 54, at 108. While I applaud the more expansive examination of this aspect of
tax policy through the lens of distributive justice, it is also apparent that distributive justicedoes not lend itself to any greater precision. See MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 36, at 38-
IVnA 11.@A
TROt TRLE WITH TAXES
underlying assumption of this piece is that fairness is inextricably
woven into the fabric of taxation. At the same time, however
instinctual our reaction to what is unfair, it is of no utility in defining
fairness because of the difficulties in establishing its meaning.
EIl. Fairness as a Constitutional Norm
The government's power to tax is seemingly unlimited.7°
Alexander Hamilton's view was that the power to tax was the most
important of the legislative powers.71 As noted in Part I, the powerful
and fundamental nature of the ability to tax has been widely
acknowledged by the United States Supreme Court throughout its
history.n From McCulloch v. Maryland3 to the present, the Court has
affirmed this necessary governmental power in the face of a variety of
challenges.74 What is remarkable is that these affirmations, save for
those in the very early cases, have been made without a discussion of,
or reliance on, fairness. Rather, the Court uses three themes that in
many ways work in conjunction: an emphasis on the basic nature of
the taxing power; deference to legislators; and establishing an
exceedingly high threshold to find a tax unconstitutional. The Equal
Protection Clause, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the dormant
Commerce Clause, and other constitutional doctrines have had
39.
70. THOMAS CARLYLE, Inertia, in THE FRENCH REVOLUTION: A HISTORY 131
(New York, Random House 2002) (1829) (describing government as a "taxing machine").
See People v. Adirondack Ry. Co., 54 N.E. 689,692 (N.Y. 1899) (Vann, J.) ("The power of
taxation [and other powers] underlie the constitution, and rest upon necessity, because
there can be no effective government without them. They are not conferred by the
constitution, but exist because the state exists .... They are... rights inherent in the state
as sovereign .... The state cannot surrender them .... They are as enduring and
indestructible as the state itself."), affd, 176 U.S. 335 (1900).
71. THE FEDERALIST No. 33 (Alexander Hamilton).
72 See, e.g., Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460
U.S. 575, 585 (1983) (stating that differential taxation power is a "powerful weapon against
the taxpayer selected"); Providence Bank v. Billings, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 514, 563 (1830)
(noting that the power to tax "operates on all the persons and property belonging to the
body politic" and "has its foundation in society itself").
73. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
74. See, e.g., Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987)
(examining a state sales tax on general interest magazines that was being challenged on
First amendment grounds); Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655, 663 (1874)
("The power to tax is ... the most pervading of all the powers of government .... "); Soc'y
for Savings v. Coite, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 594, 606 (1867) (examing a franchise tax on deposits
made to Connecticut banks that was challenged as violating enumerated powers).
,, m ,," ont.1
HASTINS.C.........NAT AW ~ xt. 01TPTR V _ R h-. j_.,.
71minimal effect in this area. It should be no surprise, then, as a
matter of constitutional law, fairness does not play an explicit part in
the Court's analysis. What follows is a broad-brush description of the
principles involved concluding with the observation that the judicial
tendency is legislative deference in tax matters.
A. The Taxing Power
The Court has taken pains to articulate that the taxing power
"resides in the government as a part of itself" and is "never presumed
to be relinquished." 76 Because the taxing power exists "for the benefit
of all" including the government itself, the Court allows seemingly
unbridled taxation of all taxpayers over which the government has
"sovereign power. '
The Supreme Court, in turn, is hesitant to impinge on Congress'
broad power to tax.78 The "assumption of constitutionality" of any
economic regulatory legislation passed by Congress restrains the
Court in these circumstances. 79  As a general proposition, thepresumption of constitutionality of economic legislation is subjected
to "more exacting judicial scrutiny" only in instances where the
Constitution specifically prohibits legislation that, for example,
75. Boris I. Bittker, Constitutional Limits on the Taxing Power of the FederalGovernment, 41 TAX LAW 3, 12 (1987) (observing that the debatable distinctions in theInternal Revenue Code would lead to never-ending judicial review). Professor Bittker'spiece also contains a wide-ranging discussion of the constitutional limits, which he
characterizes as "points of friction", on taxation that is far broader than the discussion inthis article. Id. at 5-9. See George F. Carpinello, State Protective Legislation andNonresident Corporations: The Privileges and Immunities Clause as a Treaty of Non
Discrimination, 73 IOWA L. REV. 351, 411 (1998) (Privileges and Immunities Clauseintended to preclude parochialism); Edward A. Zelinsky, Restoring Politics to the
Commerce Clause: The Case for Abandoning the Dormant Commerce Clause Prohibition
on Discriminatory Taxation, 29 OHIo NORTHERN L. REv. 29, 79-88 (2002) (criticizing theincoherence of the dormant commerce clause and constitutional doctrine).
76. Soc'y for Savings, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 606 (citations omitted) (upholding state'spower to impose a franchise tax on bank deposits reinvested into U.S. tax-exempt
securities).
77. Id. at 606; Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47 (1924) (stating that the power to tax extends
to citizens domiciled, and income derived from property situated, in foreign countries).
78. United States v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713, 733 (1985) (affirming theInternal Revenue Service's right to levy against the entire balance of joint bank accounts
of delinquent taxpayer); United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 697 U.S. (1983)(upholding the government's right to sell the entire property of a delinquent taxpayerdespite the property interests of innocent third parties); G.M. Leasing Corp. v. UnitedStates, 429 U.S. 338, 352 (1977) (rejecting Fourth Amendment challenge to seizure of
taxpayer's property in lieu of taxes); Phillips v. Comm'r, 283 U.S. 589, 595-96 (1931)(affirming revenue collection by summary proceeding).
79. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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restricts voting rights, freedom of expression or political association.'
Thus, the Court has made it clear that most differential taxation
schemes are not unconstitutional.8 ' The Court's succinct statement,
"[a]bsolute equality is impracticable in taxation,"' 2 offers the best
overview of the Court's view on the limited role of fairness in
constraining the power to tax.
A related proposition is that the Supreme Court has declined to
choose one tax scheme over another as the constitutionally
permissible norm. In Container Corporation of America v. Franchise
Tax Board, the Court gave deference to California's unitary tax
system notwithstanding the fact that the result was to skew the tax
base in California over other, more traditional methods of tax base
determination. s3 In myriad other contexts, the Court has expressly
declined to adopt, as constitutionally approved, any single method of
taxation, choosing instead to leave that choice to the Congress or
state legislatures, as the facts of the case warrant.8s
B. Deference to Legislatures.
Long ago, the Court held that "the United States cannot be held
liable for ... its public and general acts as sovereign."'' Thus, so long
80. Id.
81. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992) (noting that as a general rule
"legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact
that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality.") (citing McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961); Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 453 (1991) ("[D]ifferential
taxation of speakers, even members of the press, does not implicate the First Amendment
unless the tax is directed at, or presents the danger of suppressing, particular ideas."); see
Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Morality of Money: American Attitudes Toward Wealth and
the Income Tax, 70 IND. L.J. 119, 121 (1994) ("The history of the United States income tax
shows that this differential treatment [generally referring to sensitivity to ability to pay] is
not unusual.")
82. Lunding v. New York Tax Appeals Tribunal, 522 U.S. 287, 297 (1998) (citing
Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U.S. 525, 543 (1919)); Dane v. Jackson, 256 U.S. 589, 598-99
(1921).
83. 463 U.S. 159, 169-70 (1983) (citing Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 272
(1978)).
84. Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 498 U.S. 358, 386-87 (1991) (noting
that it is for the state legislature to establish a "single constitutionally mandated method of
taxation," not the Court); Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm'n of Webster
County, 488 U.S. 336, 341-43 (1989) (noting that states have broad powers to impose and
collect taxes); Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 169-70 (finding that the Constitution imposes
no single tax formula on the States); Moorman, 437 U.S. at 279 (holding that it is for
Congress and not the Court to enact legislation requiring all States to conform to uniform
rules for taxation).
85. Horowitz v. United States, 267 U.S. 458, 461 (1924) (citations omitted) (finding that
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as the Court finds that the government imposed the tax to perform
essential government services or to fulfill a necessary government
function, the Court can justify upholding the tax as necessary rather
than as unfair or discriminatory. This deference to government
authority supports the view that the high standard set by the Court
can "be used to validate any action... [by the government] that is not
demonstrably lunatic. ' 86
This deference to Congress or to state legislatures in matters
relating to taxation is a theme that echoes throughout the Court's tax
cases. 87 Chief Justice Marshall expressed the same thought in 1830
when he said: "The interest, wisdom, and justice of the representative
body, and its relations with its constituents, furnish the only security.
• . against unjust and excessive taxation . . . ."8 The underlying
assumption of the Court is that the democratic process will, at some
point, intrude to take the sting out of any rampant unfairness in
taxation. 89 There is a practical reason for this approach. It both
eliminates the need to decide what is fair in taxation and provides a
safety valve in the form of the democratic process. As the Court
explained in Nordlinger v. Hahn, no matter how unfair the tax system
might be, the Court has faith that the democratic system will rectify
the unfairness. 9°
C. The Threshold Required to Invalidate a Tax
The Court's reluctance to inject fairness as a factor when
reviewing cases dealing with the taxing power underscores the
apparent irrelevance of fairness as a deciding factor. The power to
tax is circumscribed only when a very high threshold of arbitrariness
or irrationality is met.9' Early cases started with the proposition that
the government can impede the performance of its own contracts by sovereign acts).
86. Walter Guzzardi, Jr., What the Supreme Court is Really Telling Business, FORTUNE,
Jan. 1977, at 149.
87. See, e.g., Providence Bank v. Billings, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 514, 563 (1830).
88. Id.
89. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979).
90. 505 U.S. at 17-18, quoting Bradley, 440 U.S. at 97. ("[The] Constitution presumesthat, absent some reason to infer antipathy, even improvident decisions will eventually be
rectified by the democratic process and that judicial intervention is generally unwarranted
no matter how unwisely we might think a political branch has acted.") Id.
91. For instance, the Court stated that:
[A] state tax law will be held to conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment only
where it proposes, or clearly results in, such flagrant and palpable inequalitybetween the burden imposed and the benefit received, as to amount to the
arbitrary taking of property without compensation - 'to spoliation under the
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the government's power to tax should not be unfettered. Hence in
Loan Association v. Topeka, the Court seemed aware of and
genuinely afraid of the government's taxation power and the resulting
ability to wreak havoc within the tax system and upon citizens. 92 As
the Topeka Court explained, the power to tax "can as readily be
employed against one class of individuals and in favor of another, so
as to ruin the one class and give unlimited wealth and prosperity to
the other, if there is no implied limitation of the uses for which the
power may be exercised." '
The Court in Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. also
espoused this approach, admonishing that a tax might fail if it "was so
arbitrary as to constrain to the conclusion that it was not the exertion
of taxation, but a confiscation of property; that is, a taking of the
same in violation of the 5th Amendment.... "94
Subsequent cases have not heeded the caution expressed in these
cases and instead have deferred greatly to the legislatures.
Nordlinger v. Hahn serves as the archetype for this other line of cases.
In Nordlinger, the Court was asked to assess the constitutionality of
California's property tax scheme under a state constitutional
amendment that created dramatic disparities between taxpayers
owning relatively similar properties. Through this acquisition-value
assessment scheme, a long-time homeowner's property tax was based
on an essentially frozen 1975-76 tax-year value, with an inflationary
guise of exerting the power of taxing.
Dane v. Jackson, 256 U.S. 589, 599 (1921) (citations omitted).
92. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655, 662 (1874). ("A government... which held the lives, the
liberty, and the property of its citizens subject at all times to the absolute disposition and
unlimited control of even the most democratic depository of power, is after all but a
despotism.") Id.
93. Id. at 664. Note the Topeka Court's recognition that a legitimate tax must strike
the uneasy balance between providing the needed financial support of the government and
being "sanctioned by time and the acquiescence of the people .... " Id. at 665.
94. 240 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1916). This same thought is articulated by the Court in any
number of its tax opinions. Further, the Court has said:
[WIhen the question is whether a tax imposed by a State deprives a party of rights
secured by the Federal Constitution,... [w]e must regard the substance, rather
than the form, and the controlling test is to be found in the operation and effect
of the law as applied and enforced by the State.
Lunding v. New York Tax Appeals Tribunal, 522 U.S. 287, 297 (1998) (quoting St. Louis
Southwestern R.R Co. v. Arkansas, 235 U.S. 350, 362 (1914)).
Where Equal Protection is concerned "inequalities that result not from hostile
discrimination, but occasionally and incidentally in the application of a [tax] system that is
not arbitrary in its classification, are not sufficient to defeat the law." Id. (quoting
Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U.S. 525, 543 (1919)).
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cap not to exceed 2%. 9' The Court noted that Stephanie Nordlinger,
as a 1989 purchaser of a "modest" Los Angeles home worth $170,000,
had a "general tax levied against her modest home... only a few
dollars short of that paid by a pre-1976 owner of a $2.1 million Malibu
beach front home." 96 In view of such disparity, Nordlinger claimed
California's tax scheme violated the Equal Protection Clause in that
such a tax was "arbitrary or irrational." 7
After analyzing California's scheme of property taxation that
explicitly favored long-time homeowners, the Nordlinger Court
recognized that taxes may reflect a state's belief that one taxpayer's
expectations are "more deserving of protection" than another
taxpayer's perceptions. 98 Remarkably, both the Nordlinger majority
and dissent explicitly conceded that this system of taxation is
discriminatory and unfair. Justice Stevens, in his dissent, referred to
California's long-time homeowners as "Squires" and said such tax
laws create "a privilege of a medieval character: Two families with
equal needs and equal resources are treated differently solely because
of their different heritage." 99 But the majority refused to invalidate
the tax even though they characterized it as a "grand experiment
[that] appears to vest benefits in a broad, powerful, and entrenched
segment of society, and... ordinary democratic processes may be
unlikely to prompt its reconsideration or repeal."1 °° In the majority's
words, the "standard [for evaluating challenges to tax laws] is
especially deferential in the context of classifications made by
complex tax laws."1 1
By allowing the tax, which it unceremoniously described as
discriminatory and unfair, the Court seems merely to have paid lip
service to its concern regarding dire consequences from taxes that
transfer wealth from one class to anotherlcc Again, we see when it
comes to taxes, the Court will not "second-guess state tax officials."1 3
95. Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 5; CAL. CONST. art. XIII A.
96. Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 6-7.
97. Id. at 8, 11 (citation omitted).
9& Id. at 13.
99. Id. at 29-30 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 18 (citation omitted).
101. Id. at 11.
102. See Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655, 664 (1874) (noting that the
taxation power "can as readily be employed against one class of individuals and in favor of
another, so as to ruin the one class and give unlimited wealth and prosperity to the
other....")
103. Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 25 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board of California also
demonstrates the Court's reluctance to substitute its judgment for
that of tax officials as to the limits of the taxing power.1°4 In Barclays,
the Court upheld California's imposition of a franchise tax using a
"worldwide combined reporting" method."' Corporations operating
in California were required to aggregate the income of their parent
corporations, affiliates, and subsidiaries, including entities operating
in other states and foreign countries. The state then taxed a
percentage of the worldwide income equal to the average proportion
of worldwide payroll, property, and sales in California.' °6  For
example, in the first of the consolidated cases, the state used the
income of Barclays Group, a multinational banking enterprise
composed of over 220 corporations, to determine the tax liability for
two independent members operating in California. The state found
that the two members were part of a "worldwide unitary business,"
and assessed them approximately $153,000 in additional tax liability.l°
Although petitioners pointed out, and the Court acknowledged,
that upholding the state's power to tax in this case meant that some
taxpayers and not others were at risk for, or would be subject to,
"multiple international taxation," the Court was still willing to uphold
the tax as an inherent state power.1°8 Congress, not the Court, is given
the power to decide whether the rights of taxpayers must yield to "tax
uniformity" or to "state autonomy."'9 If the Court is willing to
endorse cases of multiple taxation among different taxpayers, it is
relatively clear that the absence of fairness does not necessarily
render the exercise of the sovereign's powers invalid.
D. Tax and the Constitution
If the absence of fairness is not, on its own, sufficient to warrant
a finding that a legislature exceeds its authority in enacting a tax,
what elements are required for such a finding?
While Nordlinger further clarified that the Court, for the most
part, will not find a tax unconstitutional, the Court did concede that
104. 512 U.S. 298 (1994).
105. Id. at 304.
106. Id.; CAL. REv. & TAX CODE § 25128 (West 1992). Once the average percentage
was determined, that percentage of the total income of the large corporate entity as a
whole would be the tax liability for the subsidiary.
107. Barclays, 512 U.S. at 307.
108. Id. at 318-20.
109. Id. at 331.
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heightened review might be justified on Equal Protection grounds if a
tax impinged on the "exercise of a fundamental right or categorizes
on the basis of an inherently suspect characteristic. . . ."'1 However,
even in those few instances in which a tax is found to be
unconstitutional, the Court is quick to emphasize that a limitation of
the legislature's taxing power is only grudgingly enforced.
The willingness of the Court to allow relatively constraint-free
taxation, even within the bounds of such a fundamental right as
freedom of speech, was evident in a recent case. In Leathers v.
Medlock, the Court again upheld the government's relatively
unlimited ability to tax differentially.11 In this case, an Arkansas sales
tax on cable television, with an exemption for other media such as
newspapers, was found not to violate the First Amendment because
the tax was not aimed at the cable company's First Amendment
activities and the tax was not content-based. Asserting that the
legislature has "especially broad latitude" when it comes to the
creation of tax classifications, the Court stated: "[i]nherent in the
power to tax is the power to discriminate in taxation.' 1 2
1. Taxes and Equal Protection
According to the Court's decisions, it appears that Equal
Protection does not generally apply to economic disparities.
Horizontal equity, discussed in Part II, evokes the essential of Equal
Protection, with the former often serving as a proxy for the latter. To
single out one sex or the other or a racial or ethnic group for harsher
or more lenient treatment would be wrong,"' whether it be in the
context of education, employment, or taxation. As mentioned in Part
II, however, the Internal Revenue Code clearly affects some
apparently equally-situated taxpayers differently. 4  While two
taxpayers may have the same income, the Code treats differently the
110. Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 10.
111. 499 U.S. 439 (1991).
112 Id. at 451. However, see Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r
of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 579-81 (1983), in which the Court held that the "use tax" on the
cost of paper and ink products enacted by Minnesota violated the First Amendment
because it singled out the press as a whole, and because of the exemptions, a small group
of newspapers in particular. The Court feared that to allow this type of power to vest in
the state, would allow the state to indirectly regulate and suppress the press. Id. at 585.
See also Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987).
113. Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, Tax Fairness or Unfairness? A Consideration of the
Philosophical Bases for Unequal Taxation of Individuals, 12 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 221, 257
(1995).
114. Kornhauser, supra note 42, at 619-20.
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taxpayer who is chronically ill and incurs medical expenses, the
taxpayer who suffers a substantial casualty loss, and the taxpayer
whose income is derived from investments rather than labor."5 Those
who recoup damages for non-physical injuries are treated differently
from those who suffer physical injuries. 116 Married women are treated
differently than unmarried women by having their income taxed at a
higher marginal rate owing to their husband's relatively high
income. 7 Such disparities seem not to have troubled the Court.1
For example, in Kahn v. Shevin, in the face of an Equal
Protection challenge, Florida was permitted to discriminate against
widowers by not allowing them the $500 tax exemption given to
widows." 9 The Court found that the tax issue had a fair and
substantial relation to the object of the legislation (bringing balance
to the disparity between economic capabilities of men and women)."
The Court noted that it has long held that "[w]here taxation is
concerned and no specific federal right, apart from [E]qual
[P]rotection, is imperiled, the States have large leeway in making
classifications and drawing lines which in their judgment produce
reasonable systems of taxation.''
Similarly, in General Motors Corporation v. Tracy, the Court
held that an Ohio tax which exempted natural gas local distribution
companies (LDC's) from sales and use taxes did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause.' 2' In denying General Motors, a buyer of out-of-
state natural gas, tax relief based upon an Equal Protection claim, the
Court explained that "state tax classifications require only a rational
basis to satisfy the Equal Protection Clause."'' 3 The Court flatly
upheld the power to tax differentially. "[I]n taxation, even more than
in other fields, legislatures possess the greatest freedom in
115. Id.
116. Laura Sager & Stephen Cohen, Discrimination Against Damages for Unlawful
Discrimination: The Supreme Court, Congress, and the Income Tax, 35 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 447, 449 (1998).
117. Anne L. Alstott, Tax Policy and Feminism" Competing Goals and Institutional
Choices, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 2001, 2009 (1996).
118. Comm'r v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77, 95-96 (1977) (acknowledging that the system of
exclusions and deductions requires some degree of arbitrariness).
119. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
120. Id. at 352.
121. Id. at 355 (citations omitted).
122. 519 U.S. 278 (1997).
123. Id. at 311 (citations omitted).
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classification." 124
2. If Not on Equal Protection Grounds, Then On What Grounds?
If neither the First Amendment nor the Equal Protection Clause
provides sufficient grounds on which to find a tax unconstitutional,
what grounds would be sufficient? As noted above, the modern view
holds that a tax can be found invalid if it serves a deterrent purpose
seeking to completely bar an activity, if it is used exclusively to
punish, or if it is harsh and oppressive.'25 Even in the face of these
articulated limitations, however, the Court is still hesitant to declare a
tax unconstitutional unless it is a gross manipulation of the power to
tax. As the Court in Madden v. Kentucky stated, "[s]ince the
members of a legislature necessarily enjoy a familiarity with local
conditions which this Court cannot have, the presumption of
constitutionality can be overcome only by the most explicit
demonstration that a classification is a hostile and oppressive
discrimination against particular persons or classes."' 26
In Lunding v. New York, Tax Appeals Tribunal, the Court used a
test derived in its earlier decision in Supreme Court of New
Hampshire v. Piper to strike a New York income tax which
disallowed nonresidents a deduction for alimony.127 While the Court
stated that the New York tax did not meet the burden of proving "(i)
there is a substantial reason for the difference in treatment; and (ii)
the discrimination practiced against nonresidents bears a substantial
relationship to the State's objective [of attempting to tax
nonresidents' in-state activities], ' '2 in striking down the tax, the
Court stated that the Privileges & Immunities clause "affords no
assurance of precise equality in taxation between residents and
nonresidents of a particular State.'
' 29
Given the foregoing, the wide latitude the Court grants the
taxing officials, and the Court's assertion that it defers to the
sovereign's exercise of "experimental" taxation powers, one may
124. Id. (citing Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83,88 (1940)).
125. This framework is more fully described in an earlier work. Leo P. Martinez, Of
Fairness and Might: The Limits of the Sovereign Power to Tax After Winstar, 28 ARIZ. ST. LJ.
1193, 1196-1210 (1996). For the reader's convenience, I summarize the relevant portions of
that piece.
126. 309 U.S. 83,88 (1940).
127. Lunding v. New York Tax Appeals Tribunal, 522 U.S. 287, 298 (1998); Supreme
Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 284 (1985).
12& Lunding, 522 U.S. at 294 (quoting Piper, 470 U.S. at 284).
129. Lunding, 522 U.S. at 297.
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wonder just how far the sovereign may go in imposing taxes before
reaching the threshold of harsh and oppressive. 3° It is clear that to be
deemed harsh and oppressive, a legislature would have to border on
the irrational.1 3' The Court, no matter how compelling the arguments
against a particular tax, is not inclined to intrude into what it sees as a
purely legislative judgment.'32
The holdings in these cases harmonize with the Court's previous
refusal "to hold that narrow exemptions from a general scheme of
taxation necessarily render the overall scheme invidiously
discriminatory."' 3  As the Court concluded in Lunding, "where the
question is whether a state taxing law contravenes rights secured by
[the Federal Constitution], the decision must depend not upon any
mere question of form, construction, or definition, but upon the
practical operation and effect of the tax imposed."' 34
E. Making Sense of it all
Tax legislation, then, quite plainly is unique.' 35 The extreme
reluctance to second-guess the taxing authorities reveals the Court's
implicit support for the proposition that taxes play a vital role in the
existence and functioning of the government. For the sake of
preserving this vital power to tax and the government's fiscal health,
the Court appears willing to defer to sovereign taxation powers and
to sacrifice taxpayer concepts of fairness or fair play, even if this
means allowing the government to shift its tax burdens and benefits in
ways that are discriminatory and unfair.
Notwithstanding the notion that fairness or equity limits the
power to tax, the deference to legislative power is thematic, and
carries through the Court's opinions on all tax matters. What we are
left with, whether satisfactory or not, is that "the Constitution grants
legislators, not courts, broad authority (within the bounds of
rationality) to decide whom they wish to help with their tax laws and
how much help those laws ought to provide."' 36 Accordingly, "[t]he
130. See, e.g., Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of California, 512 U.S. 298 (1994);
United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26 (1994); Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 (1992).
131. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93,97 (1979).
132 Id. at 111-12.
133. Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 16-17.
134. Lunding, 522 U.S. at 297 (quoting Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37,55 (1919)).
135. This is my unalterable view. A mild, though well-reasoned, disagreement with my
position exists. See David A. Hyman, Procedural Intersection and Special Pleading: Is Tax
Different?, 71 TUL. L REv. 1729 (1997).
136. Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass'n of Central Iowa, 539 U.S. 103, 108 (2003).
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'task of classifying persons for ... benefits ... inevitably requires that
some persons who have almost equally strong claim to favored
treatment be placed on different sides of the line,' and the fact the
line might have been drawn differently at some points is a matter for
legislative, rather than judicial, consideration."'-" The Court is
consistent in its determination that the democratically elected
legislature is the place to hash out tax policy. As Chief Justice
Marshall summarized (while expressing his relief), the U.S. Supreme
Court should not be "driven to the perplexing inquiry, so unfit for the




If the Supreme Court defers to legislatures even in instances that
seem to violate the horizontal equity principle as it did in Nordlinger,
what does this mean for fairness as a viable legal norm?
It may be that tax policy is, in fact, a product of a long-term,
multi-tiered system of complicated interlocking forces. Beginning
with the proposition that there is nothing magically fair, or even
unfair, about the current status quo, and proceeding through
examples of ways in which one tax policy (for instance a deduction)
must be offset by another (a concurrent shifting of the burden
elsewhere), such a course of thought could show that fairness depends
on the scope of the inquiry. Under such an analysis, what appears
unfair this year for a certain taxpayer may be only the immediate
manifestation of an overall policy towards achieving greater fairness
for a whole class of taxpayers, or for the system overall. 9
Alternatively, by emphasizing the unfairness of tax
discrimination based on a lack of mobility or erroneous tax
classifications, one could argue that the use of the notion of fairness
in tax policy is analogous to Professor Peter Westen's idea that
notions of equality (read "horizontal equity") merely mask the more
137. United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980) (citation
omitted).
138. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,430 (1819).
139. See, e.g., William G. Gale & Jeffrey Rohaly, Three-Quarters of Filers Pay More in
Payroll Taxes Than in Income Taxes, 98 TAx NOTES 119 (2003) ("About 74 percent of
filers owe more payroll taxes (including the employer portion) than individual income
taxes .... The payroll tax is sharply regressive with respect to current income (that is, the
average tax rate falls as income rises), whereas the income tax is progressive. The
regressivity of the payroll tax is mitigated to a substantial extent if Social Security and
Medicare benefits are included as well.").
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fundamental underlying rights being violated, such as the Equal
Protection Clause of the Constitution.1 ° In such situations, fairness is,
in fact, substantive in that it does refer to clearly defined
constitutional rights. This suggests the possibility that the framers of
the Constitution were trying, among other things, to put into words
all those intuitively childish notions that form the basis of most moral
and religious systems (treat others as you would have them treat you,
do not steal, etc.) 141 Of course, although there may be evidence to the
contrary, our system of government cannot operate at a first-grade
level. 42 Simple notions of morality are not easily put into practice for
regulating the economy.
14 3
Another challenge inherent to this invocation of morality is
evident in the common criticism of politics, namely that it is driven
not by the people but by a select group of well-placed corporations
and interest groups. Politicians are well versed in spinning whatever
policy they currently wish to implement in such a way as to make it
conform to notions of fairness, family values, or apple pie. All of this
begs the question whether fairness has real meaning apart from use as
a rhetorical device.
An inherent part of our political system is that, should one
administration fail to live up to the public's notions of fairness, apple
pie and the American way (or, more cynically, at least fail to
sufficiently market these ideas to the correct demographics), that
same public can "throw the bums out." Yet what fairness means in
such a context is perhaps unknowable. People tend to remember
certain key events (assassination of JFK, low taxes and big deficits in
the eighties, Monica Lewinsky), which they then use as heuristics in
identifying larger, and much more complex portions of history. Bill
Clinton, for example, will forever be associated with thong panties,
blue dresses from the Gap and other sordid details no sensible person
should desire to have taking up valuable cranial space, while the
increase in the top marginal tax rate to 39.6% would seem to be a
non-starter to a critique of his presidency. By contrast, Stephanie
140. See Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 580-81
(1982) (noting that by subsuming constitutional rights "under the 'catchall' proposition that
'likes should be treated alike,"' equality masks the existence of those substantive rights).
141. The aphorism, "[a]ll I really need to know ... I learned in kindergarten" comes to
mind. ROBERT FULGHUM, ALL I REALLY NEED TO KNOW I LEARNED IN
KINDERGARTEN: UNCOMMON THOUGHTS ON COMMON THINGS 6 (1989).
142. Perhaps it is this that has led some to question the normative appeal of equality.
See GEOFFREY R STONE ET AL., CONSTITLmONAL LAw 480 (4th ed. 2001).
143. See, e.g., Enron.
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Nordlinger will remember well a certain tax change; indeed, it
probably will be a defining moment in her life. For her, fairness and
unfairness have a very real significance.
But at what level of inequity will the people rise up and say "no
more"? The many small inequities that plague everyone from day to
day tend to fade into the background. Like the noise of traffic or that
of the garbage truck coming around at 6:00 a.m. every Thursday, tax
inequities become a necessary part of participating in the modern
world. Petty unfairness may therefore make us grit our teeth and
contribute to our overall sense that perhaps something is not quite
right with the state of Denmark; and, perhaps around election time, a
certain candidate strikes a chord that resonates with this feeling of
disenchantment. But revolutions are not made of such stuff.
In searching for the simplest mechanism that seems to govern
our sense of fairness in taxation, two ideas emerge. First, we seem to
accept distinctions in horizontal classification that make sense.
Second, no taxpayer is locked into any particular category, but rather,
at least in theory, each has the option of upward (or downward)
mobility. Each of these ideas is developed below.'44
A. Making Sense of Horizontal Equity
We accept what makes sense to us. As a result, distinctions in
horizontal classifications often are best defended or justified on very
basic public policy grounds. The home mortgage deduction, for
example, encourages the virtue of home ownership with consequent
stability, and it also provides a not-so-indirect benefit to the
construction industry.
Professor Musgrave's dismissal of horizontal equity as a device
reduced to a guard against malicious prosecution was too quick.' 4'
While a tax lottery might be "fair" in the sense that we all would get
the chance to pay some random tax, the system would not make
common sense. According to my view, it would, as a result, not be
fair.
B. Mobility (among classifications)
The existence of mobility between horizontal classification is
144. See also Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing
Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REv. 705, 708-
13 (1970) (attempting to make sense of the federal budget and the tax system by
describing various deductions and exclusions as "tax expenditures").
145. Zolt, supra note 54, at 96 n.214.
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similarly important. Those aspects of a taxpayer that define a
category of "similarly situated" are not immutable characteristics.
Thus, I can aspire to Bill Gates' level of wealth. I can give to charity.
I can own my own home. Through such choices, I can determine and
I can control, within bounds, what my tax burden will be.'46
This latter factor, mobility, has limitations. There are immutable
characteristics that deserve protection, for example, differential
taxation based on race would not be accepted. However, there are
limits to the principle. First, outside of taxation there are immutable
characteristics that do not receive protection. Height is an example.
The systematic exclusion for the National Basketball Association
(NBA) of those of my height, while outrageous, does not give room
for me to initiate a class action against the NBA. Perhaps, this is
because height, historically, has not been a characteristic used to
justify political abuse or discrimination in the same way as have race
and sex. Hence, the jurisprudential developments surrounding the
Civil Rights Act and the Equal Protection Clause have not
concentrated on height as a suspect classification.
Economic regulation falls in the same category of limitations that
do not receive protection. This is partly due to the mobility principle
and partly because the legislative process allows a safety valve, in the
form of the democratic process.
The other area of limitation is where an apparently innocent
statute or regulation affects one group more than another. This more
insidiously reflects Anatole France's observation on "the face of the
majestic equality of the laws, which forbid rich and poor alike to sleep
under the bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal their bread." '147
Much of the scholarship criticizing the fairness of the Internal
Revenue Code is based on this aspect of the mobility principle. The
argument is that, while facially neutral, the Code is de facto
discriminatory. Racial minorities and same-sex couples illustrate the
point.' 48 For example, even when controlling for income, the I.R.C.
146. I realize this is where I depart from theories of horizontal equity. All of these
examples, except maybe charitable giving, seem to me to demonstrate differences in
vertical equity. Mobility, to me, implies movement up or down, not merely side to side.
An interesting gloss on this is the exploration of the treatment of taxpayers who reside in
different parts of the country. See Michael S. Knoll & Thomas D. Griffith, Taxing Sunny
Days: Adjusting Taxes for Regional Living Costs and Amenities, 116 HARV. L. REV. 987,
988-89 (2003). My observation would be that because the choice of my residence is up to
me, the mobility principle would not be violated in such instances.
147. ANATOLE FRANCE, THE RED LILY 91 (Winifred Stevens trans., 1925).
148. See, e.g., Patricia A. Cain, Heterosexual Privilege and the Internal Revenue Code,
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still treats African-Americans differently because of different
patterns of living and consumption. 149 African-Americans, according
to one study, are more likely to lead lives that do not exploit the tax
benefits of the I.R.C. as others.)' If true mobility, which the Code
presumes to be possible, is actually unattainable, then the Code must
be viewed as unfair. 5' The inequalities that stem from this lack of
true mobility and those inherent to the I.R.C. discussed by Professors
Moran and Whitford are exacerbated further by the fact that socio-
economic inequities are not the inequities to which constitutional law
and disparate impact analysis have afforded much protection.
Though the Court in Nordlinger upheld the California taxing scheme,
it did come close to acknowledging the need for such protection when
it recognized that the California scheme was irrational and unfair,
while concluding that the legislature is the vehicle by which to seek
redress.
C. Violations of the Common Sense/Mobility Principles
Where either the common sense or the mobility principle is
violated, the reaction is sure and swift. Where there is perceived
inconsistency or unfairness in the system, there is heard a cry to refine
or modify it.
152
An historical review of selected notorious examples of instinctual
34 U.S.F. L. REv. 465 (2000) (noting various ways in which the Internal Revenue Code
disadvantages homosexuality as compared to heterosexuality). Professor David Brennan
has neatly surveyed recent related literature. David Brennan, Race and Equality Across
the Law School Curriculum, 54 J. LEGAL EDUc. 336, 337 n. 5 (2004).
149. Beverly I. Moran & William Whitford, A Black Critique of the Internal Revenue
Code, 1996 Wis. L REv. 751,757 (1996). Professors Moran and Whitford conclude that:
Blacks have less of the type of investment wealth which benefits from the
realization requirement and special rates for capital gains. Blacks also receive
fewer gifts and inheritances, a form of tax free accessions to wealth. When blacks
do have wealth, they are more likely to invest in assets that are not tax favored,
such as vehicles. Blacks do invest in homes, the primary asset for most American
families, but black homes are on average less valuable and generally appreciate at
a slower rate than white homes. As a result, the homeownership tax benefits,
particularly the deductibility of home mortgage interest and property taxes, are
more beneficial to whites than blacks.
Id. at 799-800.
150. Id at 757.
151. Knoll & Griffith, supra note 142, at 988-89 (arguing that misallocation of capital
and labor is the cost of failing to account for geographical differences in income and cost
of living).
152 See Steven M. Sheffrin, Perceptions of Fairness in the Crucible of Tax Policy, in
TAX PROGRESSIVtTY AND INCOME INEQUALITY 309 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1994) (discussing
empirical research on perceptions of fairness).
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and spectacular reactions to perceived unfairness in the allocation of
tax burdens illustrates the point. Indeed anecdotal (read "rough-
hewn empirical") evidence of this proposition abounds in history and
in psuedo-history."' Examples include the legendary Lady Godiva,
an English noblewoman who rode naked through Coventry to
persuade her husband, Earl Leofric of Mercia, to lighten the taxes on
his subjects.' 4 Our own Boston Tea Party and the 1794 Whiskey
Rebellion were both grounded in popular opposition to unpopular
taxes.'55 In 1773 Boston, a group of men disguised as Native
Americans forced their way aboard Boston-bound ships which carried
tea destined for sale to colonists. 6 In order to protest the British Tea
Act, they dumped the tea in Boston Harbor.5 7 A few years later,
when Congress passed a bill raising the excise tax on liquor,
Pennsylvania farmers who made whiskey banded together and
refused to pay the tax.'1  As a consequence, President Washington
was forced to call upon 13,000 militia in order to end this defiance of
federal authority." 9
More recently, in the late 1980's, the Thatcher government in
England introduced a poll tax under which every man and woman
over age 18 was subjected to the same absolute level of tax. 6' The
resulting reaction was a violent protest of an almost unprecedented
scale - the most serious incident involved hundreds of people who
153. CAROLYN WEBBER & AARON WILDAVSKY, A HISTORY OF TAXATION AND
EXPENDITURE IN THE WESTERN WORLD (1986); George Guttman, IRS Tax Amnesty, 22
TAX NOTES 1361 (1984); DALL W. FORSYTHE, TAXATION AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN
THE YOUNG NATION 1781-1833 60-61 (1977); Robert J. Haws, A Brief History of
American Resistance to Taxation, in INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE, 1983 A.B.A. SEC. ON
TAX'N 113; CYRIL NORTHCOTE PARKINSON, THE LAW AND THE PROFITS 22-35 (1960).
154. RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 563 (2d ed. 2000) (Godiva
defined).
155. See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 6, at 50; WEBBER & WILDAVSKY, supra
note 149, at 31; Haws, supra note 149, at 113; FORSYTHE, supra note 149,at 60;
PARKINSON, supra note 149, at 22-35.
156. CHARLES A. BEARD ET AL., THE BEARDS' NEW BASIC HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES 106 (1968).
157. Id.; see also ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 2 MICROPEDIA READY REFERENCE
405 (15th ed. 2003). The protesters were soon disillusioned when the British government
failed to yield and instead the Parliament enacted a statute which served to close the port
of Boston to all trade by sea. BEARD ET AL., supra note 152, at 106.
15& BEARD ET AL., supra note 152, at 106; see also ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 12
MICROPEDIA READY REFERENCE 623-34 (15th ed. 2003).
159. BEARD ET AL., supra note 152, at 106 (1968).
160. Barbara Amiel, A Taxing Lesson for the Iron Lady, MACLEAN'S, Apr. 16, 1990, at
13.
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fought a bloody battle with police in London's East End. 16' The tax
and the reaction to it are credited. with the demise of the Thatcher
government and the diminution of the fortunes of the Conservative
Party.162
In this country in the late 1980's, an example of this sentiment
was introduced in Congress as Senate Bill 604 and would have been
entitled, if enacted, the "Omnibus Taxpayers' Bill of Rights Act."'
1
Not surprisingly, the Taxpayers' Bill of Rights enjoyed popular
political support.164 This support was not only derived from the
traditional enmity reserved for the tax collector but also from
documented incidents of abusive and, in a few cases, criminal conduct
directed against taxpayers by Internal Revenue Service ("I.R.S.")
employees.' 6' Predictably, at least one of the authors of the bill
charged that under the current system, the I.R.S. "ha[d] too many
rights, and the taxpayer too few. '"' 66
161. Andrew Phillips, A Bloody Tax Revolt, MACLEAN'S, Mar. 19, 1990, at 22. In
reaction to the revolt, 38 Tory members of Parliament broke with their party and voted for
an amendment which would have introduced a rudimentary link between income and
levels of taxation. Scrap Poll Tax, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 23, 1988, at 14, 17.
162. SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 6, at 49.
163. S. 604, 100th Cong. (1987). The Bill was introduced on February 26, 1987 by
Senators Pryor (D. Ark.), Grassley (R. Iowa) and Reid (D. Nev.) for the ostensible
purpose of promoting and protecting taxpayer rights. Id. Senate Bill 604 is modeled on
Senate Bill 579 introduced by Senators Reid, Nickles and Breaux as "The Taxpayers' Bill
of Rights Act."
164. Gary Klott, Tax Watch: Fighting IRK S.: Uneven Match, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1987,
at D2; Press Release, Senator Charles E. Grassley, Grassley Seeks to Repeal Tax on
Human Potential (Feb. 10, 1987), reprinted in 34 TAx NOTES 731 (1987) (DOC. 87-771).
The author confesses that eliminating the need to save receipts and keep records holds a
certain fascination and attraction.
165. In fiscal year 1986, 259 criminal cases involving current or former I.R.S.
employees were filed and 236 resulted in conviction or guilty pleas. Scott R. Schmedel,
Tax Report: A Special Summary and Forecast of Federal and State Tax Developments,
WALL ST. J., Jul. 8, 1987, at Al; Stephen E. Silver, IRS "Sting" Tactics Under Attack in the
Courts, 60 TAXES 650 (1982). There has been some indication that the I.R.S. is
responding to correct errant agents' behavior. Scott R. Schmedel, Tax Report: A Special
Summary and Forecast of Federal and State Tax Developments, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23,
1987, at Al.
166. Press Release, Senator Charles E. Grassley, supra note 160. One of the principles
espoused by the Taxpayers' Bill of Rights was to shift the burden of proof in tax cases to
the I.R.S. At the time, I criticized the notion and feared that my musings would be seen as
stating the obvious. Leo P. Martinez, Tax Collection and Populist Rhetoric: Shifting the
Burden of Proof in Tax Cases, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 239, 242-43 (1988). Imagine my surprise
when the burden shifting idea gained currency, and in fact, ten very short years later,
became part of the fabric of the Code. See I.R.C. § 7491 (2004).
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D. The Slight Risk of Overstatement
By reducing the tests for determining fairness to the absurdly
simple, I pause to emphasize that the approach above is simplistic in
the extreme. Moreover, it does not account for those situations, such
as Nordlinger, in which common sense seems to have taken flight and
there is still no bue and cry to reform the system. Still, the point is
that the simplistic seems to be the rule. If the judiciary is prone to
defer to the legislative will and if the threshold for invalidating taxes
remains high, we are left what one researcher has concluded, and that
is: "[F]airness is what people say it is."' 67 It is then only a small step
with a minimal risk of overstatement to say that at its core, this is
nothing more than a child's intuitive view of the world.
In essence, it is likely that taxpayers, like all individuals, and
similarly, first-graders, want to be treated "fairly." As shown above,
taxpayers react to tax situations that they perceive as unfair.
Reminiscent of the adage regarding bad art and Justice Stewart's view
of obscenity,16 individuals know unfairness when they see it. Perhaps
they also know fairness when they see it, but fairness is difficult to
identify clearly in the whirl of spinning punditry.'69
Conclusion
Understandably, then, that only in situations involving more
identifiable violations of constitutional rights can tax policies be said,
with any certainty, to be fair or unfair. In the area of constitutional
rights carrying the weight of solid precedent, the Supreme Court
ostensibly knows what it is doing. In the area of taxation, however, it
may feel more adrift; and, as in many such cases in which the law does
not point in any one certain direction, the Justices may engage in the
favored practice of tossing the ball back to Congress for further play.
It is tempting to conclude that fairness is not relevant to taxation.
However, this would contradict the wide acceptance fairness has
correctly received in the formulation of tax policy. Indeed, one could
not plausibly argue that a lack of fairness is the characteristic of any
tax system. We would be left with an unprincipled lack of intellectual
defensibility of tax policy.
Professor Alexander Bickel once said that "[n]o good society can
167. MINAREK, supra note 67, at 23.
168. The quote is "I know it [i.e., obscenity] when I see it." Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S.
184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
169. See, e.g., Michael L. Roberts & Peggy A. Hite, Progressive Taxation, Fairness, and
Compliance, 16 LAw & POL'Y 27,40 (1994).
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be unprincipled; and no viable society can be principle-ridden."'7 He
went on to state that judicial review is "the principled process of
enunciating and applying certain enduring values of our society. '
Yet, thus far, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to incorporate
the notion of fairness in its review of taxation. Perhaps this is because
fairness, while an enduring value of our society, has not developed
beyond a child-like notion. Thus we should not be surprised that
notions like fairness and horizontal equity have failed to find a
constitutional voice.
170. Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term Forward- The Passive
Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40,49 (1961).
171. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 58 (1962).
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